Recessions and persistent unemployment in many developed and developing countries over the last decade have increased interest in the operation of labor markets. Much of the debate on the causes of unemployment has focused on the role of real wages. Although the restoration of equilibrium in the labor market during the recent recessions would appear to have required a fall in real wages, one widely held view is that this either has not taken place or has taken place very slowly, resulting in prolonged unemployment. Three reasons have been advanced as to why real wages may not be sufficiently flexible to clear the labor market. First, there may be legal impediments to lowering wages. Second, if workers are unable to detect whether a firm is accurately representing the demand for its products, they may resist wage cuts and prefer layoffs or firings. Because an employer would prefer to pay lower wages regardless of demand conditions and would want to decrease its employment only if times were bad, a layoff may be a more credible indication of true demand conditions. Third, a firm's management might also resist wage cuts if it feared that they would reduce the efficiency of its work force.
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A different view on why unemployment has persisted and even increased is that aggregate demand has been low. Governments, reacting to balance of payments problems and revenue reductions caused by the fall in export prices, adopted contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, an approach that led to a fall in the demand for labor and to Keynesian unemployment (for studies that analyze the cyclical behavior of real wages in developed countries, see Sachs 1980 , O'Brien 1985 , Mitchell 1985 , Rosen 1985 , Solow 1987 , and Ashenfelter and Card 1987 .
There is considerable empirical evidence regarding the behavior of real wages and employment in developing countries, and this generally supports the first view (see Edwards 1986 , Collier 1986 , Sanchez 1987 , Demekes and Klinov 1987 , Fallon 1985 . The studies have been based rnainly on analyses of aggregate wage changes, however, which implicitly assume that the composition of the work force remains the same over the business cycle and that the relation between real wages and the business cycle is the same for all individuals or groups of individuals.
This article uses a case study of C6te d'Ivoire to demonstrate that reliance on aggregate data can lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the role of real wages in labor market adjustment during a recession. Using data from the 1979 and 1984 censuses of private and semipublic firms and employees in the modern sector, we consider changes in real wages at an aggregate level and then at the firm and individual level in order to contrast the macro and micro evidence.
Although employment in the modern sector makes up only 10 percent of total employment in C6te d'Ivoire, this sector is most li]kely to have rigidities and to have government policies directed toward it. Moreover, employment practices in the modern sector do not affect only current employees, but also those unemployed and in the informal sector. For exalmple, relatively high unemployment rates of educated individuals in developing countries may be due to their preference for secure jobs in the public sector, in which wages are unresponsive to business cycle fluctuations (Squire 1981) .
Besides presenting a more accurate picture of the movement in real wages, the micro data provide important information about the turnover of firms that is not apparent from the aggregate data. Although the entry of new firms and the growth of surviving firms are the two vehicles for new job creation and recovery from a recession, little evidence is available on their relative importance in developing countries. From a policy viewpoint, it is important to understand not only where an expansion comes from, but also the factors that influence it. For example, the effects of an export subsidy on existing firms may be different than on new entrants. If firms that survived the recession have underutilized capital, increasing the price of their product may be sufficient to increase employment and output without any new investment. For new firms to increase employment and output, new investment may be required. Without credit, the new smaller firms would be unlikely to respond to an export subsidy by increasing production and employment. This type of compositional variation is examined comprehensively below.
Section I describes the survey data and provides a brief account of the recent recession in C6te d'Ivoire. The real wage changes evident from the aggregate data are presented in section II and then contrasted with the changes evident from an analysis of the micro data. Section III discusses the dynamics of employment changes, distinguishes among exit, entry, and survival of firms, and relates these three phenomena to characteristics of the firm such as size, age, sector, and private or public ownership. Our conclusions are presented in section IV.
I. THE RECESSION IN C6TE D'IVOIRE: THE DATA AND THE EXPERIENCE Our analysis of the effect of the 1979-84 recession on employment and wages in Cote d'Ivoire is based on data from two labor force surveys of the modern sector, the 1979 and 1984 Enquetes de Main d'Oeuvre, coordinated by La Direction des Etudes et de la Recherche de l'Office National de Formation Professionelle (ONFP), an agency of the government of C6te d'Ivoire. In the surveys, the modern sector was defined as those establishments in industry, commerce, and services that realized a minimum value of production, or followed an accounting system called "Le Plan Compatable Ivorien," or, in the case of the agricultural sector, met certain production levels. These surveys furnish longitudinal information on each firm and its employees in 1979, the beginning of the recession, and 1984, after the trough of the recession.
Some expansion of the coverage and types of information collected occurred between the 1979 and 1984 censuses. We have excluded from our analysis here information on 1,106 firms from the 1984 survey that were established before 1979 but were not included in the 1979 survey. These firms employed 36,199 workers in 1984. The firms that were included in the 1984 survey as a result of the expanded coverage paid average wages that were 25 percent lower than either the new or surviving firms in the 1984 survey. In addition, new hires in the latter firms were paid mean wages 40 percent higher than those of new hires in the firms added due to wider coverage. If these new hires had been included in the analysis for 1984, the decline in real wages would have been overestimated. These patterns indicate that those added may have been smaller service-oriented firms often classified as part of the informal sector. More significantly, they suggest the importance of using data obtained at the micro level to control for compositional differences, a point which becomes more apparent as the analysis proceeds.
The 1979 survey also did not provide individual data on apprentices and on the two classes of manoeuvres (the lowest skill category), although aggregate data were reported. Therefore in our analysis of the individual characteristics, information on only the five highest skill groups and the higher class of manoeuvre was used.
Firms are classified as "surviving" if they are present in both the 1979 and 1984 censuses, whereas "entries" are those established after 1979. As a check that the entries were not just old firms with a new name, we confirmed that they had no employees hired before 1979. We do not have information on firms formed after 1979 which went out of business before the 1984 survey. Thus all references to new firms over a specified period are conditional on the firm having survived to the survey date.
Although there was some economic growth in 1980 and some sectoral recovery by 1984, the surveys generally bracket Cote d'Ivoire's 1979-84 recession and allow us to investigate the effects of recession on employment and wages. The history of C6te d'Ivoire parallels the experience of other developing countries that experienced a boom in primary commodity prices in the 1970s. Because the government paid a fixed producer price and sold at international prices, rising prices for its two main export crops, coffee and cocoa, resulted in a large increase in government revenues. The government used these revenues to stimulate investment: between 1976 and 1978, public investment as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 15 percent to 25 percent, while the rate of growth of GDP averaged 9.0 percent a year.
Between 1977 and 1978, coffee and cocoa prices declined by 31 percent and 10 percent, respectively, remaining at those levels until the first half of 1980. At the same time, import prices rose, with oil prices doubling in 1979. These changes resulted in a cumulative decline of 31.7 percent in C6te d'lvoire's terms of trade in the 1977-79 period. Rather than reducing investment, the government increasingly relied on external borrowing to finance the continued expansion. Together with rising interest payments on external public debt, this borrowing transformed a balance of payments surplus into a deficit amounting to 12 percent of GDP in 1980.
In 1981, the government initiated a drastic financial recovery and structural adjustment program, supported by an International Monetary Fund loan and two structural adjustment loans from the World Bank (1981 and 1983) . The program called for a reduction in the public sector and current account deficits and the restoration of overall balance of payments equilibrium by the end of 1983. Additional objectives were to remove the price distortions and to establish incentives to improve resource allocation. The government instituted a 24 percent cut in real public investment in 1981, followed in 1983 by a further 20 percent decline in public current and capital expenditures. Together with the continued fall in coffee and cocoa prices and a drop in export crop production attributable to a severe drought, the contractionary measures adopted by the government contributed to a deepening recession between 1981 and 1984.
The extent of the recession is reflected in the decrease in modern sector employment between 1979 and 1984 (table 1). Employment in the modern sector, which had 248,350 workers in 1979, had declined by 31 percent by 1984. Roughly two out of every three firms in the 1979 survey (2,164 firms) had gone out of business by 1984. Although the number of exiting firms exceeded the number of new entering firms by just 127, firm closures eliminated 67,511 jobs, which substantially exceeded the 25,853 jobs contributed by entering firms. There was a further reduction of 35,098 jobs among the a. A total of 17 of the 1979 firms had merged into 4 while 10 had split into 32 by 1984, which accounts for the discrepancy in the entries for firms.
Source: Calculations based on data from ONFP, Cote d'lvoire.
1,079 surviving firms. Sixty-six percent of all job losses arose as a result of the closure of firms and 34 percent as a result of the net contraction of surviving firms.
The firms that survived also experienced considerable turnover of personnel. Of the 145,741 employed in 1984, 80,317 had been with the same firm in 1979, while 65,424 had been hired since then. We do not know whether those newly hired had been employed at the same firm in a previous period. The implication of these figures is that 100,522 workers (or 55 percent of the work force) in surviving firms lost their jobs or were laid off between 1979 and 1984.
II. MOVEMENTS IN REAL WAGES
Examination of the behavior of real wages between 1979 and 1984 shows that the conclusions about the extent of real wage flexibility are significantly altered by adjusting for compositional changes in employment. entering as part of the expanded coverage). Given the 48 percent rise in the consumer price index (cPI) during this period, this implies a real wage of CFAF 70,500 in 1984 and a real increase of 17.5 percent.' There were no differences in the average real wage for new and surviving firms in 1984. But in 1979 the firms which were to survive paid a higher wage than those which exited. The strong countercyclical movement of wages indicated by the aggregate data suggests that slow adjustment or rigidity of real wages was a potentially important factor in explaining the employment loss in the modern sector. The aggregate picture is misleading, however, for it does not take into account the large compositional changes that accompanied the contraction in employment. For example, the share of unskilled workers in total employment declined from 69 to 56 percent, whereas the share of management-level employees increased from 1.8 to 2.4 percent. Given the large differences in the wage rates across educational or occupational groups, controlling for the compositional changes makes a difference. If the composition across occupational categories had remained the same in 1984 as in 1979, the average real wage rate in 1984 would have been CFAF 55, representing a decline of 8 percent from 1979.
The view that real wages were rigid may also be challenged by looking at the variation across firms, not simply at the mean. Table 3 presents the distribution of the change in mean real wages for surviving firms. Fifty-one percent of the firms witnessed a real decrease in their mean wage. The reductions were greatest among small and agricultural firms and lowest among large firms and firms in the manufacturing sector.
Data on real wages of workers by professional categories or by firms still embody a high degree of aggregation. This level of aggregation does not allow one to address the key question related to wage flexibility: are firms able to hire workers of a given quality at lower wages during a recession? This question is best addressed by an analysis of real wages received by individual workers within each firm.
The data on individual workers allow us to consider separately the wages of workers that remained in the surviving firms and the wages of newly hired workers. The wage of new hires is a measure of the marginal cost of labor to the firm-what the firm must pay to hire a worker of a given set of characteristics. Given the substantial turnover of firms and workers within firms, declines in real wages of new hires can be an important mechanism for achieving wage cuts.
Because a newly hired worker has not built up specific human capital in the firm, this wage also may be a measure of an alternative wage-what a worker would receive if he or she left the current job and obtained employment elsewhere. For retained workers, there may well be specific human capital gener- ated by the job association. If their wages are set as an outcome of a bargaining process between firms and workers over the resulting rents, the behavior of wages of retained workers need not follow that of new hires.
Wage Changes of Workers Who Retained Their Jobs
It is not possible to determine the extent to which wage rigidity contributed to unemployment by examining the wage changes of those who remained employed without accounting for workers who become unemployed (see the discussion in Beckerman and Jenkinson 1986) . Only where a worker retains the job is it possible to observe a wage change, and by definition, these workers' wages were sufficiently flexible to ensure employment. The question then becomes, could real wages fall in response to reductions in demand? If they can fall (and we find evidence that they can), to argue that the rigidity of wages was responsible for the loss in employment requires explaining then why wages were not able to fall for those who became unemployed. An alternative explanation for the loss in employment in the modern sector is that wages were flexible, but when they fell below what could be obtained in the informal sector, workers went into the informal sector.
Over the five-year period, those who retained their jobs experienced no change in real wages, despite the severe recession. However, as the distribution of real wage changes for both sexes shows (table 4) , that trend did not apply to all workers. Forty-four percent of the males and 42 percent of the females suffered real wage decreases over this period. The proportion of workers in each sector facing real wage declines ranged from 43 to 48 percent, with the agricultural sector having not only the largest proportion of its workers experiencing a decline, but also having the greatest share facing the most severe cuts (a cut of 20 percent or more). The public sector had the second largest share of retained workers facing declining wages, whereas the private and nontraded sectors had the smallest share. The highest proportion of workers experiencing real wage declines was found among the lowest education levels: more than 55 percent of uneducated workers suffered a real wage decline (not shown). Although observed differences in wages are appropriate for comparing the welfare of individuals over a set period, they are not necessarily the best indicator of the extent of flexibility in the wage structure. This is because they do not account for the different patterns of earning over a person's work life: unskilled workers typically face flat wage profiles, whereas skilled workers generally face an upward sloping profile. Thus the wage in 1984 corresponds to a different point on an individual's wage profile than was true in 1979. Wage profiles may also shift as a result of macroeconomic changes in the economy. A recession may induce a downward shift in the profile of unskilled workers that could result in a lower wage, as may have happened in the period between 1979 and 1984. Conversely, skilled workers' wages may not decline despite a downward shift in their wage profile.
To examine the extent of real wage flexibility, we believe it is more informative to look at changes in real wage profiles, which we estimated for 1979 and 1984. The mean values and definitions of the explanatory variables used in the regressions are given in table 5. The business-cycle variable employed is the ratio of the number of workers who left the industry to the total number hired in the year previous to the survey. Contracting industries will tend to fire more workers than they hire, making the value of the index higher. The average value of the index rose, reflecting the recession in the economy between the two surveys. a. Differences in the number of observations for retained workers are due to missing values for some of the explanatory variables.
Source: Calculations based on data from ONFP, C6te d'lvoire. Table 6 presents estimated coefficients from the regressions for retained workers using the log of the monthly wage as the dependent variable. The results indicate a good overall fit. The human capital variables exhibit the same general pattern as is found in other human capital wage equations. The rate of return on education is 16 percent in 1979, which is high but comparable to the 20 percent rate of return in C6te d'Ivoire found by van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1987) . The estimated return on vocational training is very high, especially in 1979, but note that the mean of this variable is low. The overall flat 5 percent return on experience also corresponds to the overall return to experience in van der Gaag and Vijverberg. The effects of the firm-level variables did not change greatly. The coefficient of the business-cycle variable was negative in 1979-the greater the ratio of workers leaving than entering, the lower the wage. In 1984, the coefficient was essentially zero. Because before the 1979 survey the economy was growing whereas before the 1984 survey it was declining, this may suggest a differential response to demand conditions depending on the position in the business cycle.
Because it is difficult to infer what happened to the level of wages from the table of coefficients, figure 1 presents graphically the wage profiles predicted by years of firm-specific experience calculated at the mean values of the explanatory variables. There is a downward shift in the wage profile between 1979 NO. I and 1984, a trend that is not inconsistent with the constant level of average real wages for retained workers which is apparent from the raw data, because that was calculated by comparing a point on the 1979 profile (at roughly eight years of specific experience) with a different point on the 1984 profile (thirteen years of specific experience). At eight years of experience in 1984 there is a decline in real wages of 17 percent relative to the 1979 level. However, if wages at eight years of experience in 1979 are compared with those at thirteen years of experience in 1984, there was a 1 percent decrease in the latter period.
There are two sets of factors determining the shape and level of the wage profile: first, the values of the personal, firm, and industry characteristics; and second, the strength of their influence on the wage. If we wish to separate out the effect of a change in a variable's level from a change in its effect on the wage, we can predict wages using the 1979 values of the characteristics. The result predicts what the wage would have been if there had been no changes in the values of the characteristics.
We know that the personal characteristics of the labor force changed over the period: education, training, and firm-specific experience all increased. If we retain the 1984 values of the firm and industry variables, but give the personal characteristics their 1979 values, we estimate a 1984 wage profile which would have been 24 percent lower than it was. This indicates that declines in the returns to personal characteristics were mainly responsible for the decline in the real wage profiles. Alternatively, if we hold education and training constant, but predict on the basis of eight years of experience in 1979 and thirteen in 1984 (the actual mean values of firm-specific experience), the real wage drops by 8 percent, which is very close to the figure obtained above when controlling only for occupational category in the aggregate data.
As mentioned above, the 1979 survey omits information on individual characteristics of apprentices and manoeuvres (the second class in the lowest skill category). A comparison of the aggregate wage change from table 2 (which includes those categories) with information on the higher groups suggests that real wages for the two excluded groups fell by around 10 to 15 percent.
Wage Flexibility among New Hires
In both years the wage level of new hires was lower than that of retained workers (table 5) . But individual characteristics for new hires differ from those of retained workers so that we would not expect their wages to be the same. To analyze the effect of the different characteristics, we used the same empirical specification for their wage as was used for the wages of retained workers. To ensure comparability between the results for 1979 and 1984, we have excluded new hires in firms that were included in the 1984 survey as part of the expanded coverage. The mean wages of new hires in new firms and in surviving firms were almost identical. The results of the analysis are presented in table 7.
The regression results again indicate a good fit, and the human capital variables are important. The returns on education and specific experience went up for new hires by 1984. Although the change in the return on specific experience could reflect changes in the wage growth in the firms, it could also indicate a tempering of the growth in entry-level wages over the period. Relative to the 1979 survey, more of the new hires in the 1984 survey were hired in the early part of the five-year period. Wages for the newly hired in public firms went from being 4 percent less than in private firms in 1979 to 16 percent less in 1984. Thus, in the effort to reduce the size of the public sector, parastatals reduced the nominal wages of new hires by considerably more than they reduced the wages of those who remained employed. Wages for retained workers in public firms, which had been 13 percent lower than in private firms in 1979, were 19 percent lower in 1984 (table 6). As was the case for retained workers, in industries with relatively more workers leaving than entering, real wages for new hires are lower. The pattern is much more pronounced in 1979 than in 1984.
Figure 2 presents predicted wage profiles for the new hires based on years of general experience. Comparing the wage profiles at the mean years of general experience (fifteen years for both 1979 and 1984) reveals a decline of approximately 6 percent. However, if new hires in 1984 had the same characteristics as they had in 1979, the decline in the wage profile would have been 25 percent. As was the case with retained workers, the observed decline in the wage profile was due to a decline in the returns to the characteristics. Table 8 summarizes the real wage changes as revealed by aggregate and individual data. Although the universe of all workers consists only of retained workers and new hires in 1984, this is not the case for 1979. Workers who were hired before 1974 and who lost their job between 1979 and 1984 are not included in the estimation. Moreover, some of the retained workers include workers newly hired in 1979. This means that taking a weighted average of the real wage changes of the retained and newly hired workers will not exactly replicate the aggregate picture.
Summary of Real Wage Changes
Controlling for the composition of the work force in the aggregate data makes a difference, reversing the picture from one of a real wage increase to that of a decrease. Once this point is evident, little additional information is gained by reconstructing the aggregate picture from the micro components (although it is possible to do this). It is more important to ask what happened to the wages that firms must pay for the characteristics they value. This is best measured by the change in real wages obtained holding characteristics constant. Over the course of the recession, firms were able to pay their existing workers and their newly hired workers approximately 25 percent less in real terms for the same level of characteristics.
III. CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT
The evidence presented above suggests that real wage rigidity may not have been as important a factor as previously thought for the slow growth in employment during the recession. In this section we examine changes in the 
Employment Generated by New Firms
During the period 1979-84, 2,037 new firms were formed, accounting for 65 percent of the firms in the modern sector as of 1984. However, this very high rate of entry produced only 25,853 new jobs, just 15 percent of total employment. Most of the entering firms in this period were very small: 80 percent employed fewer than 10 people, and an additional 10 percent employed from 10 to 19 people (see table 9 ). The average size of entering firms was a mere 13 employees, compared with 135 in the surviving sample. The low level of employment in new firms during the recent recession is very different from the employment in new firms established before 1979 (see table 10). Between 1974 and 1979, 1,241 firms created 45,687 jobs, for an average firm size of What underlies the disappointing rate at which new jobs were created between 1979 and 1984? Sectoral disaggregation shows a marked decline of employment in public sector enterprises. In the period 1974 and 1979, 30 percent of the employment generated in the modern sector was in firms 50 percent or more publicly owned. Between 1979 and 1984, this percentage fell to 16 percent. The decline in the rate at which public firms were created accounted for 45 percent of the reduction in employment generation. The severe budgetary problems faced by the government led to the cuts in public sector employment and would seem to preclude using an expansion of public firms to increase employment, even if that were considered to be desirable.
If private sector expansion is to be sought instead, it is important to have an idea of the shifts in growth that have occurred within the modern sector. As shown in tables 9 and 10, the pattern of entry shows a substantial movement toward the nontraded goods sector. The commercial and services sectors, which together accounted for 80 percent of all new firms in the 1984 survey, had the lowest average firm size and the highest entry rate (defined as the number of new firms as a proportion of all firms in the sector). The state sector, comprising public and private administration, also increased in relative importance. All together, the percentage of new jobs created by the nontraded goods sector went from 49 to 61 percent. The absolute number of jobs created by new firms declined by 27 percent in the nontraded goods sector, with almost all of the fall due to a decline in construction. In the transportation, commerce, and service sectors the number of jobs created by new firms remained roughly the same.
The 54 percent decline in the number of jobs created by new firms in the traded goods sector is due entirely to the decline in jobs created by new manufacturing firms; employment in the primary sector did not fall. Manufacturing firms contribution to new firms' employment fell by 48 percent, from 42 to 22 percent of the total, more than offsetting the small absolute increase in the primary goods sector. The overall decline occurred despite the depreciation of the CFAF relative to the currencies of Cote d'lvoire's main trading partners over the 1980-84 period.
Employment Change in Surviving and Exiting Firms
We examined the more detailed data to see if the changes in employment in preexisting firms differed substantially from that of entering firms or if sectoral variation emerges within this set. Table 11 presents the pattern of employment change among surviving firms and the employment loss due to firm closure. Firms in the traded goods sector accounted for 40 peircent of employment among surviving and existing firms in 1979. Among surviving firms only, traded goods employment was 44 percent in 1979 and 49 percent in 1984. Most of the movement in the nontraded goods sector, hovvever, was dominated by the large drop in construction, mainly attributable to the decrease in government investment. If construction is excluded, it appears that surviving nontraded goods firms suffered less of a decrease in employment (with a net loss of 835 jobs) than did traded goods firms, which lost nearly 7,000 workers. Among surviving firms, the decline in employment in the traded goods sector was 9 percent, considerably less than that suffered by new firms.
As would be expected, there is a direct positive correlation between firm age and size, and the survival rate through the recession. The level of employment, however, does not respond as straightforwardly to these variables. Surviving firms employing fewer than 10 workers did experience a decline in total employment from 1979 to 1984, but employment rose in all other size categories up to 300 employees. For surviving firms, the largest percentage decline in Table 11 . Size and Age Distribution of Surviving and Exiting Firms, by Employment, 1979 Aggregate data provide a misleading account of the behavior of real wages and employment. For Cote d'Ivoire, the overall figures suggest that employment in the modern sector fell by 16 percent from 1979 to 1984 while real wages rose by 18 percent. The reduction in employment is underestimated, however, as the coverage of the survey in 1984 was wider than that of 1979 and thus took into account more than 1,000 firms that had existed in 1979 but were not surveyed. After correcting for the expanded coverage in the later survey, the decline in employment is estimated to be 31 percent.
Similarly, although aggregate figures suggest very little change in the number of firms, a large turnover of firms took place. Almost half the firms went out of business during this period, to be replaced by an almost equal number of new enterprises. The new firms, however, were much smaller on average than those that they replaced, so that employment declined sharply. The high rate of closure was responsible for two-thirds of the decline in employment during the recession, and contraction in surviving firms accounted for the remaining third lost. Public firms provided 29 percent of the jobs generated by new enterprises from 1974 to 1979, but during the recession this dropped to 16 percent.
The decline in employment should not be attributed to the increase in real wages which appears at the aggregate level. Decomposition of the data shows that wages seem to have fallen in response to the contraction that took place in many sectors of the economy. Although workers' education, training, and firmspecific experience increased over the period, our estimates indicate that by the end of the recession employees were receiving substantially less for the same attributes and experience than they were at the beginning of the period. A new worker in 1984, with the same attributes as the average new employee in 1979, would be paid 25 percent less in real terms in 1984.
The decline in real wages varied across sectors. The largest proportion of employees facing a wage decline occurred in the agricultural and public sectors. Within public sector firms, real wages of retained workers, which were 13 percent less than those paid by private firms in 1979, fell to 19 percent less in 1984 and from 4 to 16 percent less for those newly hired.
The government was forced to cut investment, employment, and real wages during the recession, which clearly contributed to the decline in employment we have analyzed. Our survey does not suggest solutions for the government of C6te d'Ivoire. It does indicate, however, that further declines in wages are unlikely to provide the answer: real wages dropped throughout the period, and clearly this was not sufficient to offset other deterrents to employment. The government must look to other incentives and conditions to generate the recovery in employment it seeks.
